The last post I made was written in a state of blissful psychosis. And yes, I do mean, literally, psychosis. If you didn't already know, I am an expert in that subject, for reasons which may well be biological.
And in that post I said some things which definitely rung of psychosis, like, essentially, the basis of all morality as being open to the idea of everyone killing everyone. Nevertheless, while the post may have been—quite enjoyably—formed in psychosis (the previous one to that having been formed in a state of depression), the ideas expressed were actually formed, and even named, earlier.
The concept I was expressing I have named "absolute eclectic morality." And the principle behind it is that the basis of morality is not dogma, not intuition, not biology, and not any conceptual framework, but in openness to frightening and painful things. But while some of these earlier posts may well serve as a great introduction, I have yet to explain, to my satisfaction anyway, the way in which an anarchic state of "absolute eclectic morality" culminates in a more orderly state of conventional morality.
Consider this analogy. A man has a positive goal. He wants to make a change in the world. He wants to start a political party. He may think, "What exactly should I do, in society, to put forth my political views?" In his natural thought process, the thought may occur that he should kill a bunch of people whom he disagrees with. Obviously, this is the most expedient way to form a political party. But will it really fulfill the intended goal? If you live in a society where such behavior is acceptable, the goal may well never be achieved, or even formed. How can we achieve anything with the constant threat of death biting at our heels? So this thought is discarded.
We can stop right there, because clearly, in a similar manner, any behavior which is immoral will eventually be discarded. But was the man an immoral man for such a monstrous thought to occur to him? Absolutely not. It was perfectly natural. The process of fulfilling a goal begins first with a state of formation. Okay, I have a goal, now how do I fulfill it? The word "how" here is loaded with possibilities, and in this initial stage, each possibility is an acceptable one. This initial state is what I call absolute eclectic morality, because morality here means that all possibilities are open, eclectically, and will only be adopted or discarded based on their relative merit. The process which follows, of course, weeds out the immoral acts, due to their low relative merit.
So far I've proceeded in a very Confucian way. I've analyzed morality in terms of a "goal variable" if you will. It's entirely external, because the internal state of accepting the goal as valid and moral is taken as a given. But obviously the morality of a goal cannot be taken as a given. There are some goals which are, in fact, immoral. We can't just assume a moral goal.
But while eclectic morality may seem external, it rather seeps inward with the following concept: eclectic morality in no way means that all actions are justified. It merely acknowledges an infinite array of justifiable actions which encompasses all finite ideas. It acknowledges the fact that, in an infinitesimally subtilely distinct set of two situations, not weeping when a person coughs may be unjustified, while slaughtering that person with a knife is completely justified. Even if the two actions are separated by a mere moment, or the smallest of details. Of course the converse is true too; slaughtering the person may be unjustified, while weeping at his coughing may not be. (And obviously this is more often the case.)
But what allows for the sacred distinction between good and evil? It is, in fact, a state of absolute eclectic morality. The morality of an act depends on the entire context of the act. And "entire context" here is implied in the term "eclectic." The formation of goals must therefore also be taken into account. When one internally forms a goal, the context of the goal-formation must be taken into account in an eclectic way. And when that goal is externalized, all the various external methods for achieving that goal must similarly be taken into account.
From either perspective, internal or external, it will function the same way. If you produce a goal, and you're not sure if it is the correct one, absolute eclecticism will demand that you consider the possibility that the goal itself needs to be altered. Not as a return to the original goal, but as a clarification of the greater goal of what it means to be human. And likewise, if your intentions are good, absolute eclecticism will demand that the execution also be good. This is the way my moral understanding functions. And I believe it functions in all situations, internal, external, or otherwise.
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